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Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: 
Rethinking the Materiality of Information and 
the Reasonableness of Investors 
Peter H. Huang* 
This Article critically analyzes the judicial decisions and rea­
soning of the United States Supreme Court and lower courts 
accepting certain defenses in securities fraud litigation. This 
Article develops how and why the core notions of materiality 
of information and the reasonable investor should be revised 
in light of recent empirical data, experimental evidence, and 
theoretical models of moody investing. This Article proposes 
modifying three recent developments in materiality doctrine 
to take into account moody investing. In particular, this Ar­
ticle argues that current judicial treatment of puffery is flawed 
because it neglects the power of puffery to alter moods. This 
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Article also recommends modifying the judicial "total mix" 
analysis of the materiality of information to include a "total 
affect" analysis of information. Finally, this Article proposes 
refining the judicially created so-called "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine and statutory safe harbors codifying it to inquire 
whether so-called "meaningful cautionary language" is in­
fused with affect. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For better or worse, securities litigation and enforcement have re­
cently become growth industries, with numerous allegations of se­
curities fraud and malfeasance at, but certainly not limited to Enron, 
WorldCom, the research analyst departments of many investment 
banks, and several mutual funds . 1 The United States Supreme Court 
and lower courts have gradually accepted over the last two decades 
certain defenses in securities fraud cases that make it likely that 
many such cases will be dismissed. But, publicity from those corpo­
rate and financial scandals led to Congress nearly doubling the Secu­
rities and Exchange Commission's budget from $439 million in 2002 
to $776 million in 2003.2 Congress also passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 which, among other things, targeted specific funding for 
the SEC to hire at least two hundred attorneys, accountants, and 
other professionals, and for enhancing information technologyi3 ex­
tended the statute of limitations for private securities fraud actions/ 
and created a new crime of securities fraud.5 Thus, securities litiga­
tion and enforcement will continue as booming legal practice areas 
long after the notoriety of recent financial scandals fades .  
The level and nature of securities litigation and enforcement do 
and should depend on the level and nature of securities investing. In 
particular, standard neoclassical financial economics models envi­
sian rational actors cognitively engaging in securities investing to 
maximize their expected utilities.6 But the real nature of securities 
1 See generally Donna M. Nagy, et al, Securities Litigation and Enforcement. Cases 
and Materials (West, 2003 ) .  
" Id at6 1 8 . 
3 1 5  USCA § 78 (kk) ( 2002). 
-1 1 8  usc§ 1 658 (b )  (2002 ) .  
0 1 8  usc§ 1 348 (2002 ) .  
6 But see Lourdes Beneria, Economic Rationality and Globalization: A Feminist 
Perspective, in Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson, eds, Feminist Economics To­
day: Beyond Economic Man 1 24 ( Chicago, 2002) ( pointing out how important emo­
tions and moods are in actual human behavior) and Richard H. Thaler, From Homo 
Economicus to Homo Sapiens, 1 4  J Econ Perspectives 1 33 ( 2000) (predicting that ra­
tional and unemotional homo economicus will evolve into homo sapiens, a quasi­
rational and emotional human being) .  
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investing can be quite moody.7 At this point, it helps to differentiate 
among three distinct, but related concepts: affect, emotion, and mood. 
Affect refers to a general and pervasive "feeling state that people ex­
perience, such as happiness or sadness .  It may also be viewed as a 
quality (e .g .  goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus ."8  Emo­
tions are "reactions to motivationally significant stimuli and situa­
tions, including three components: a cognitive appraisal, a signature 
physiological response, and phenomenological experiences .''9 Moods 
refer to "longer-duration background states of the physiological ( au­
tonomic) system and the accompanying feelings."lD 
It also helps to distinguish between expected emotions, which are 
predictions of future emotional consequences of the outcomes from 
decisions, and immediate emotions, which are emotions that indi­
viduals experience while making decisions. 1 1 This Article focuses on 
immediate moods, investors feel before or during investing, and there­
fore complements my previous work on emotions, which are fully and 
correctly expected before or during the decision making process. 12 
7 See Lucy F. Ackert, et al, Emotion and Financial Markets, Second Quarter Eco­
nomic Review 33 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2003 ) (suggesting that emotions 
can enhance financial decision making); and Michael Dowling and Brian M. Lucey, The 
Role of Feelings in Investor Decision-Making, unpublished manuscript (2003 ) ( syn­
thesizing empirical research on the impact of emotions on stock prices and developing 
a theoretical basis for understanding that empirical research). See also David Dreman, 
The Influence of Affect on Investor Decision-Making, 5 T Behavioral Fin 70 (2004) (ex­
amining investors' reliance on affect under information overload) .  
·'Melissa L. Finucane, et al, The Affect Heuristic in [udgments of Risks and Bene­
fits, 13 T Behav Dec Making 1, 2 n . 1 (2000 ) .  
0 R.  Hastie, Problems for [udgment and Decision Making, 5 2  Ann Rev Psychol 653, 
6 7 1  (200 1 ) . 
lo Id. 
11 See, for example, George Loewenstein and Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of A ffect 
in Decision Making, in RichardT. Davidson, et  al, eds, Handbook of Affective Sciences 
6 19, 620-36 ( Oxford, 2003) (proposing this distinction for understanding how emotions 
have different influences on decision making) .  
1 "  Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 Intl Rev 
L & Econ 3 1  ( 1 992)  ( studying how emotions influence decisions to sue, settle, or pro­
ceed to trial in game-theoretic models ); Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, More Order 
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J L, 
Econ, & Org 390 ( 1 994) ( showing formally how guilt may sustain the honoring of trust 
in principal-agent relationships); Peter H. Huang, Dangers of Monetary Incommensu­
rability: A Psychological Game Model of Contagion, 1 46 U Pa L Rev 1 70 1 ( 1998 )  (com­
menting on emotions that arise from commodification and monetary commensura­
bility); Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 Wake Forest L Rev 639 
( 1 999) (discussing emotions that may occur when utilizing markets to allocate repro­
ductive technologies and genetic engineering); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Pas­
sions. Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 Or L Rev 435 (2000) 
( analyzing the role of anger and shame in Coasian bargaining); Peter H. Huang, Inter­
national Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 3 1  J Legal Stud S23 7 
(2002 ) (proving mathematically that the fear of losing face can generate compliance 
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The rest of this Article is organized as follows . Section I defines 
moody investing and very briefly reviews empirical and experimental 
evidence of moody investing. Section II explains why and how moody 
investing affects whether information is material and whether in­
vestors are rational. The remaining sections critically analyze three 
recent, but well-developed aspects of materiality doctrine in securi­
ties law because they fail to into account moody investing. Section III 
assesses the so-called puffery defense because that defense ignores 
the mood-altering power of puffery. Section IV critiques the so-called 
" total mix" analysis of materiality and proposes the addition of a "to­
tal affect" analysis of information. Section V advocates refining the 
so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and statutory safe harbors cod­
ifying that doctrine to inquire whether " meaningful cautionary lan­
guage" affects moods. A conclusion summarizes the Article and sug­
gests directions for additional research. 
II. MOODY INVESTING 
Traditional finance assumed unbounded rationality of cognitive in­
vesting, while behavioral finance focuses on the bounded rationality 
of cognitive investing.13 The phrase "moody investing" stands in con­
trast to cognitive or non-moody investing. There is  experimental 
evidence of systematic differences between two psychological pro­
cesses that people utilize to construct their preferences, namely val­
uation by calculation and valuation by feelings . 14 Recent research in 
psychology and the neurosciences reveals that humans comprehend 
and face risk utilizing two fundamental systems, one analytic and 
the other experiential.1 5 Of course, in practice, "reason and emotion 
are intertwined as the threads in an oriental carpet." 16 But, moody in-
with international environmental law); and Peter H. Huang, Trust ,  Guilt and Securi­
ties Regulation, 151 U Pa L Rev 1059 (2003) (demonstrating analytically that guilt can 
reduce opportunistic behavior by broker-dealers and other corporate actors ) .  
11 See, for example, Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral 
Finance. in George Constantinides, Milt Harris, and Rene Stulz, eds, Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance 1053, 1054, 1065-75 ( North-Holland, 2003) (reviewing the cog­
nitive psychology of investing). 
14 Christopher K. Hsee and Yuval Rottenstreich, Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On 
the Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J Experimental Psychol: Gen 23, 24-28 (2004) 
(reporting on four experimental studies and their implications ) .  
'' Paul Slovic, e t  al, Risk a s  Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Though ts about 
Affect, Reason, Risk. and Rationality, 24 Risk Analysis 1-11 (2004) ( explaining the dif­
ference between these two ways of processing risk and their implications ) .  See also 
Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions that Involve Risk: A Dual-Process 
Approach, 1 3  Current Directions Psychol Rsrch 60 (2004). 
16 Richard Restak, The Secret L ife of the Bra in 109 ( Joseph Henry, 2001 ). See also 
Jeremy R.  Gray, Integration of Emotion and Cognitive Control. 13 Current Directions 
Psychol Rsrch 46 (2004). 
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vesting refers to investing that is ( at least, partially) non-cognitive. 1 7 
The collapse of the dot. com stock bubble is only the latest example 
of moody investing.18 In addition to anecdotal support, there is em­
pirical data that moody investing not only occurs/ 9 but also affects 
securities prices and market performance.20 Experimental research 
finds that individuals evaluate stocks not in terms of the relation­
ships between risk and return, but instead based upon their global 
attitudes towards those stocks .2 1  Experimental research indicates 
that "factors other than technical fundamentals are often used by 
market participants to gauge the value of securities. This phenome­
non may be quite prevalent in markets for IPOs, where securities lack 
a financial history The imagery and affect associated with securities 
can be a powerful basis upon which to judge their worth." 22 Affect 
and images crucially shape people's attitudes towards securities and 
their judgments concerning securities .23 On the positive affect side, 
in 2000 and 2001, a $3 million advertising campaign in European 
and Asian magazines and newspapers introduced a series of global 
mutual funds alongside fashion supermodels and contained the af­
fective tagline : "the most beautiful investments in the world."N On 
the negative affect side, perceived dangers of genetically manipulated 
organisms can stigmatize biotechnological stocks .25 Long-term fi­
nancial images tend to be more positive than short-term financial 
17 See generally Richard Geist, Investor Therapy: A Psychologist and Investing 
Guru Tells You How to O u t-Psych Wall Street (Crown Business, 2003)i and Lawrence 
E. Lifson and Richard A. Geist, The Psychology of Investing (Wiley, 1999) .  
lx See generally Eli Ofek and Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania:  The Rise 
and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J Fin 1113 (2003)i Maggie Mahar, Bull: A History 
of the Boom, 1982-1999: What Drove the Breakneck Market-and What  Every In­
vestor Needs to Know About Financial Cycles (Harper Business, 2004li and Roger 
Lowenstein, Origins of the Crash:  The Great B u bble and its Undoing ( Penguin, 
2004) . 
IY Andrew W. Lo and Dmitry V. Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Finan­
cial Risk Processing, 14 J Cognitive Neurosci 323, 325-32 (2002) . 
20 See, for example, Kevin Au, et al, Mood in Foreign Exchange Trading: Cognitive 
Processes and Performance, 9 1  Org Behav & Human Decision Processes 322 (2003) 
(providing empirical evidence of the impact moody investing). 
21 Yoav Ganzach, Judging Risk and Return of Financial Assets, 8 3  Org Behav & Hu­
man Decision Processes 353, 357-68 (2000) ( presenting four supporting experimental 
studies ) .  
2 2  Donald G. MacGregor, et al, Imagery, Affect, and Financial Judgment, 1 J Psy­
chol & Fin Markets 104 ( 2000) . 
23 Melissa L. Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn, eV Mad Money: Applying What We 
Know About the Perceived Risk of Technologies to the Perceived Risk of Securities. 
3 J Psychol & Fin Markets 15, 18 (2002). 
24 Suzanne Kapner, Selling Mutual Funds with Beau ty, not Numbers. NY Times, 
Dec. 14 , 2000, at C8. 
2 5  Baruch Fischoff et al, Investing in Frankenfirms: Predicting Socially Unaccept­
able Risks. 2 J Psychol & Fin Markets 100, 107-10 (2001) . 
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images.26 Finally, a recent event study documented that positive ab­
normal returns and increased trading volume followed a company's 
Super Bowl television commercials .27 
Each of the following can affect moods on the part of investors 
and/or securities professionals and in so doing, lead to moody invest­
ing and influence securities prices: financial rumors/8 fluctuations 
in the amount of daylight over the yeari29 seasonal variations in bio­
rhythms or sleep disruptions caused by changing from and to daylight 
savings/0 and weather conditions .3 1 But, moods are not due to so-
2 "  Donald G.  MacGregor, Imagery and Financial Judgment, 3 J Psycho! & Fin Mar­
kets 15, 18 ( 2002 ) .  
27 Frank Fehle, e t  al, Can Companies Influence Investor Behavior through A dver­
tising! Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns (unpublished manuscript, avail­
able at www.ssrn.com) ( 2003 ) .  
2 '  See generally Jos  Van Bommel, Rumors, 58 J Fin 1 499 (2003); Robert Menschel, 
Markets, Mobs eJJ Mayhem: A Modern Look at the Madness of Crowds ( John Wiley & 
Sons, 2002 );  and Mark P. Schindler, Rumors in Financial Markets: Survey on How 
They Evolve, Spread, and Are Traded On, Institute for Empirical Research in Eco­
nomics, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 459 ( 2003 ) .  
2 9  Mark Jack Kamstra, et al, Winter Blues: A SAD Stock Market Cycle, 93 Am Econ 
Rev 324 ( 2003 ) (providing international evidence of a link between seasonal depression 
and seasonal variation in stock returns). But see Patrick J. Kelley and J. Felix Meschke, 
The Link Between Depression and Stock Returns: A Reexamination ( unpublished 
manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com) (June 15, 2004). 
30 Mark Jack Kamstra, Lisa A. Kramer, and Maurice D. Levi, Losing Sleep at the 
Market. The Daylight Savings Anomaly, 90 Am Econ Rev 1005 (2000); Michael Dowl­
ing and Brian M. Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock Returns: Some Preliminary 
Irish Evidence ( unpublished manuscript 2002 ) .  
·11 See, for example, Dowling and Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock Returns 
(cited in note 30) (finding that rain and clock changes around daylight savings have mi­
nor but significant influences on Irish stock prices); David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler G. 
Shumway, Good Day Sunshine .  Stock Returns and the Weather, 58 J Fin 1009 (2003 ) 
(finding a strong positive correlation between morning sunshine at a country's leading 
stock exchange and the market index stock returns that day at twenty-six stock ex­
changes internationally from 1982-97); K. Lam & S .S .  Lam, The Phenomenon of El 
Nino. The Relationship Between Weather and Stock Prices, Hong Kong Econ J (Apr. 
22, 1998) (finding that stock prices in Hong Kong related to weather conditions, which 
in turn were related to investors' moods); Edward M. Saunders, Jr., Losing Stock Prices 
and Wall Street Weather, 83 Am Econ Rev 133 7  ( 1993 ) .  See also W. Kramer & R. Runde, 
Stocks and the Weather: An Exercise in Data Mining or yet Anoth er Capital Market 
Anomaly, 22 Empirical Econ 63 7 ( 1997) ( replicating Sa under's study for Frankfurt, Ger­
many); M.A. Trombley, Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather: Additional Evidence, 36 
Q J Bus & Econ 1 1  ( 1 997 )  ( reexamining Sa under's study) .  But see William N. Goetzmann 
and Ning Zhu, Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?, National Bureau of Eco­
nomic Research Working Paper No W9465 ( Feb 2003) (finding virtually no difference in 
the propensities of individual investors five major U.S .  cities over a six-year period to buy 
or sell stocks on cloudy days versus sunny days and interpreting this as evidence that at­
titudes, behavior, and moods of market-makers, rather than individual investors, may 
account for the relation between stock returns and weather); Tim Loughran and Paul 
Schultz, Weather, Stock Returns, and the Impact of Localized Trading Behavior, 39 J Fin 
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called "sunspots " that are beyond the control or prediction of securi­
ties issuers . In fact, mandatory securities disclosures and voluntary 
securities communications themselves affect moods and in so doing, 
lead to moody investing.32 The legal and policy implications for se­
curities litigation and enforcement of recent advances in our under­
standing of economics, marketing, and psychology are the subject of 
this Article. 
Three recent economic models about how moods affect decision­
making provide insights about moody investing. First, an economic 
model that extends expected utility theory by explicitly incorporat­
ing feelings demonstrates how investors experiencing anxiety affect 
asset prices .33 This psychological expected utility model also has im­
plications for the amount of information that a doctor should give a 
patient before an operationi34 policy issues raised by the increasing 
availability of genetic testingi and raising the low personal savings 
rate in the United States .35 
Second, the closed-form solution of a simple general economic 
equilibrium model demonstrates that small fluctuations in the moods 
of investors have potentially large impacts on stock prices.36 This 
model assumes that these three hypotheses are true.37 First, investors 
are unaware of their investment decisions being influenced by their 
& Quantitative Analysis 3 43 ,  3 45, 3 55-62 (2004) (finding little empirical evidence Nas­
daq stock returns are related to cloudy weather in the city where a company is based) . 
. n Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities 
Markets, in Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of Irra­
tional Behavior (Stanford, forthcoming) ( analyzing the implications of moods for the 
long-standing debate over whether mandatory or voluntary securities disclosures is a 
better system of providing information about securities risks to investors ) .  
3 3  Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Psychological Expected Utility Theory and An­
ticipatory Feelings, 116 Q J Econ 55, 60-66, 66-69 (2001) ( introducing an economic 
model of anxious decision-making and investigating the implications of anxiety in 
that model for asset pricing). 
34 Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, The Supply of Information by a Concerned Ex­
pert, 114 Econ J 48 7 ,  488 -502 (2004) ( applying the above model of anxious decision­
making and psychological game theory to analyze whether a physician should reveal 
the truth to a naively optimistic terminally ill patient ). 
3" Andrew Caplin and John Leahy, Behavioral Policy, in Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. 
Carillo, eds, The Psychology of Economic Decisions: Rationality and Well-Being 73-
8 7  ( Oxford, 2003 ) (applying the above model of anxious decision-making to behavioral 
medicine and savings decisions ) .  See also Lauren G. Block and Patti Williams, Undo­
ing the Effects of Seizing and Freezing: Decreasing Defensive Processing of Personally 
Relevant Information. 3 2  J Applied Soc Psychol 803 (2002) ( offering practical advice to 
practitioners on designing more effective health-related advertisements ) .  
_�6 Rajnish Mehra and Raaj Sah, Mood Fluctuations, Projection Bias, and Volatility 
of Equity Prices, 26 J Econ Dynamics & Control 8 69 ,  8 73-83 (2002) ( deriving such a 
model ) .  
1 7  Id at 870.  
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mood fluctuations. Second, investors' judgments of the appropriate 
discount factor or their degrees of relative risk aversion fluctuate in 
response to moods fluctuations. Third, investors uniformly and widely 
experience the impacts of such mood fluctuations on their subjective 
judgments or attitudes towards risk 
Third, a novel economic model analyzes people's behavior as the 
result of two interacting processes in the human brain, namely an af­
fective system encompassing motivational drives and emotions and a 
deliberative system taking into account broader goals .38 This model 
formally captures the familiar notion of being "of two minds ." The 
model has novel testable predictions for intertemporal preferences, 
risk preferences, and social preferences. For example, the model pre­
dicts that when the affective system plays a stronger role than the 
deliberative system in decision making, the nonlinear probability 
weighting function should become more S-shaped. In particular, this 
means that when a person is under cognitive load or stress or when 
her willpower is depleted, she will exhibit a more S-shaped probabil­
ity weighting function. The model also suggests that risk aversion is 
driven by the affective system. 
Several strands of current psychological research explore the inter­
play of cognitive and emotional processes.39 First, empirical research 
supports an affect or "how-do-l-feel-about-it" heuristic, by which 
people rely on their affective feelings in making decisions and judg­
ments .40 Second, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis postulates that people 
often perceive risks in visceral terms.4 1  To be clear, the affect heuris-
3s George F. Loewenstein and Ted O 'Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and 
Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior (unpublished manuscript, available at 
www.ssrn. com) (May 4, 2004) . 
. w See generally Eric Cich, Cognition and Emotion ( Oxford, 2000) .  See also Louis C .  
Charland, Is Mr. Spack Mentally Competent! Competence to Consent and Emotion, 
5 Phil, Psychiatry, &. Psycho! 67, 7 1-72 ( 1998) (describing recent neurophysiological, 
philosophical, and psychological research suggesting that emotions are fundamentally 
cognitive). 
40 Melissa L. Finucane, et al, Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect 
and Reason, in Sandra L. Schneider and James Shanteau, eds, Emerging Perspectives 
on Decision Research ( Cambridge, 2003) ( analyzing the affect heuristic) ;  Paul Slavic, 
et al, The Affect Heuristic, in Thomas L. Gilovich, et al, eds, Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 397, 400-20 ( Cambridge, 2002 ) ( defining the af­
fect heuristic, providing empirical evidence, and discussing manipulation of affect) ;  
Paul Slavic, et al, Rational Actors or Rational Fools. Implications of the Affect Heuris­
tic for Behavioral Economics, 3 1  J Soc-Econ 329 (2002 ); and Cass R .  Sunstein, Haz­
ardous Heuristics, 70 U Chi L Rev 75 1 ( 2003 ) ( reviewing Gilovich, Heuristics and Bi­
ases ( cited above in this note), and discussing legal implications of the affect heuristic). 
"1 George F. Loewenstein, et al, Risk-as-Feelings, 127 Psycho! Bull 267 ( 200 1). An 
important aspect of such visceral perception of risk is probability insensitivity or neg­
lect. See Yuval Ruttenstreich and Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric 
Shocks. On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 1 2  Psychol Sci 185 ( 1999) (providing ex­
perimental evidence of such probability insensitivity); and Cass R. Sunstein, Proba -
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tic and the risk-as-feelings hypothesis are related and share a com­
mon perspective that people do not simply deal with risks analyti­
cally. Third, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) specifies those condi­
tions under which affective information becomes incorporated into 
people's cognition and constructive processing, selectively and influ­
encing their associative processes, attention, learning, memory; and 
the outcome from their deliberations.42 The Affect-As-Information 
model posits that people utilize their feelings at a given moment as 
information regarding their attitudes.43 Fourth, affect and feelings have 
both strengths and weaknesses in judgment and decision-making.44 
Fifth, fairly subtle manipulations of affect, in particular inducing dis­
gust and sadness, have dramatic effects on the endowment effect .4 5 
Finally; patients with lesions in specific components of a neural cir­
cuitry for emotional processing displayed less loss aversion and earned 
more money in simulated real-life investment decisions than indi­
viduals without brain lesions and patients with lesions in areas of the 
brain unrelated to emotional processing.46 
bility Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 1 1 2 Yale L J 6 1 ,  70-82 ( 2002 ) (devel­
oping legal implications of probability neglect) .  See also Thomas E.  Nygren, Alice M.  
Isen, Pamela J .  Taylor, and Jessica Dulin, The Influence of  Positive Affect on the Deci­
sion Rule in Risk Situa tions: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) 
Rather Than Probability, 66 Org Behav & Human Decision Processes 59 ( 1 996 ). 
42 Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 1 1 7 
Psyschol Bull 39 ( 1 995 )  ( arguing that the extent to which people rely on their feelings 
to make decisions depends on how abstract, risky, and uncertain those decisions are ) .  
See also Dolores Albarracin and G.  Tarcan Kumkale, Affect as Information in Persua­
sion: A Model of Affect Identification and Discounting, 84 J Personality & Soc Psychol 
453, 456-65 ( 2003 ) (presenting three experimental studies finding curvilinear influ­
ences of ability and motivation on affect ) .  
"·' Norman Schwarz, Feelings a s  Information: Moods Influence Judgments a n d  Pro­
cessing Strategies. in Gilovich, Heuristics and Biases at 534, 536-547 (cited in note 40) 
( presenting and reviewing evidence that moods influence information processing)i 
Norman Schwarz, Situated Cogmtion and the Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning 
in L Feldman Barrett and P. Salovey, eds, The Wisdom of Feelings (Guilford, 2002Ji 
Norman Schwarz and Gerald L Clore, Mood, Misattribution and Judgments on Well­
Being.· Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J Personality & Soc 
Psychol 5 1 3 ( 1 983 ) ( proposing the Affect-As-Information modelJi and Norman Schwarz 
and Gerald L Clore, How Do I Feel About W The Informative Function of Affective 
States in K. Fiedler and J .P. Forgas, eds, Affect, Cognition, and Social Behavior 44 
(Hogrefe &Huber., 1 99 1 ) . 
44 Michel Pham, The Logic of Feeling, 1 4  J Consumer Psychol (forthcoming, 2004) 
(discussing the adaptive role of affect and feelings in judgment and decision making ) .  
" "  Jennifer S .  Lerner, et al, Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carry-over Effects of 
Emotions on Economic Transactions, 1 5  Psychol Sci 33 7 (2004 ). See also Ellen Peters, 
et al, The Role of Affect in the WTA/WTP Disparity, 1 6  J Behav Dec Making 309, 3 1 1 -
26 ( 2003 ) ( reporting on four experimental studies relating affect to the differences be­
tween willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept prices) .  
"" Baba Shiv, e t  al, Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion (unpub­
lished working paper, University of Iowa) (2003 ) .  
108 M oody Investing and the Supreme Court 
Consumer and marketing researchers have also made considerable 
progress in understanding the role of moods in persuasionY In fact, 
the role of affect in the academic marketing literature is quite in­
structive as it progressed through the stages of complete, then relative 
neglect; recognition on an equal footing with cognition; general anal­
ysis; moving past a distinction between positive and negative to focus 
on discrete emotions; and reaching a consensus that affect and cog­
nition are inseparable. Historically; the information processing model 
of consumers as logical decision-makers was ubiquitous, treating af­
fect as occurring only after much cognition, which is pre-eminent 
and irrevocable.48 But, a few social psychologists argued that affective 
reactions are primary; inescapable, and therefore as important as cog­
nition.49 Subsequent marketing researchers emphasized how moods 
impact the recall, evaluations and behaviors of consumers . 50 Other 
marketing researchers have focused on specific types of emotions that 
are common in commercials, such as warmth/1 fear, 52 or desire . 53 
47 This brief synopsis draws upon the discussions in a Wharton graduate marketing 
seminar on advanced topics in consumer behavior session about affect led by Patti 
Williams .  Patti Williams, The Role of Emotions in Persuasion, Address at the Associ­
ation for Consumer Research Doctoral Consortium ( 2003 ) .  See also Morris B. Hol­
brook, Wha t  is Consumer Research, 14 J Consumer Rsrch 128, 130 ( 1987 )  ( contrasting 
marketing research with consumer research) .  See generally Wayne D. Hoyer and Deb­
orah J. Macinnis, Consumer Behavior 236-37, 265-67 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed, 2004); 
Michael R. Solomon, Consumer Behavior.· Buying, Having, and Being 227-3 1 ( Pren­
tice Hall 6th ed, 2004). 
•s Morris B. Holbrook and Elizabeth C .  Hirschman, The Experien tial Aspects of 
Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J Consumer Rsrch 132, 132-
34, 139 (1982 ) ( arguing that many emotions and feelings matter to consumers ) .  
4 9  See generally Robert B .  Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need no In­
ferences, 35 Am Psycho! 15 1 ( 1980) and Robert B. Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affective 
and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J Consumer Rsrch 123 ( 1982 ) .  
so See, for example, Meryl Paula Gardner, Mood States and Consumer Behavior, 12 
J Consumer Rsrch 281, 132-34, 139 ( 1985 ) ( arguing that many emotions and feelings 
matter to consumers) and Rajeev Batra & Michael L. Ray, Affective Responses Medi­
ating Acceptance of Advertising, 13 J Consumer Rsrch 234, 235-39 ( 1986) ( arguing that 
affective responses to advertisements represent moods and feelings evoked by adver­
tisements). See also Alexander Fedorikhin and Catherine A. Cole, Mood Effects on At ­
titudes, Perceived Ris], and Choice: Moderators and Mediators, 14 J Consumer Psy­
cho! 2 (2004) (presenting experimental evidence investigating the moderating role of 
constructive processing in mood effects on risk perceptions of consumers ) .  
51 David A. Aaker, et a!, Warmth in  Advertising: Measurement,  Impact, and Se­
quence Effects, 12 J Consumer Rsrch 365, 368-69 ( 1986) ( introducing the "warmth 
monitor" ) .  
52 Punam Anand Keller & Lauren Goldberg B lock, Increasing the Persuasiveness of 
Fem Appeals: The Effec t  of Arousal and Ela boration, 22 J Consumer Rsrch 448, 450-
56 ( 1996) (finding conditions under which anti-smoking messages that prompt low and 
high fear levels are likely to be effective). 
53 Russell W. Belk, et a!, The Fire of Desire: A Multisited Inquiry in to Consumer 
Passion, 30 J Consumer Rsrch 326 ( 2003 ) (developing a phenomenological account of 
I , 
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Still other marketing researchers found that feelings in response to 
commercials influence their cognitive processing. 54 Another market­
ing researcher investigated the conditions under which consumers 
are more likely to rely on the "how-do-l-feel-about-it" heuristic . 55 
III. MATERIAL INFOR MATION AND 
REASONABLE INVESTORS 
Moody investing means that the United States Supreme Court and 
lower courts should rethink their answers to what it means to be a 
reasonable investor and what it means for information to be material . 
The question of what is material information is related to the ques­
tion of what is a reasonable investor because of statutory language 
and judicial interpretation. 56 Although United States federal securi­
ties regulation is mainly statutorily based, judicial decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court and lower courts play a large role in the 
statutory interpretation of the United States federal securities regu­
lations. Although the literature about cognitive biases and heuristics 
also suggest non-moody arguments in favor of rethinking materiality 
and what is a reasonable investor;57 this Article champions a com­
plementary and more fundamental rethinking of the notions of a rea­
sonable investor and materiality based upon moody reactions to fi­
nancial risks and securities disclosures . 
The question of whether a particular item of information is mate­
rial is central to securities litigation and enforcement . Rule 408 of the 
Securities Act requires that registration statements contain, in addi­
tion to particular specifically required disclosures, "such further ma­
terial information . . .  as may be necessary to make the required state­
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading."58 Rule 12b-20 of the Securities Exchange Act imposes 
the same requirement in mandated periodic disclosures . 59 Questions 
of materiality arise in the anti-fraud civil liability provisions of sec-
desire based on inquiries into daily discourses, interviews, journals, and projective data 
in the United States, Denmark, and Turkey) .  
"" Julie A. Edell and Marain Chapman Burke, The Power of  Feelings in Under­
standing Advertising Effects, 14 J Consumer Rsrch 421 ,  43 1 ( 1987 )  ( finding that affec­
tive processing and cognitive processing of commercials are intertwined) .  
s s  Michel Tuan Pham, Representa tiveness, Relevance, and the Use of Feelings in 
Decision Making, 25 J Consumer Rsrch 144, 1 46-57 ( 1 998 ) ( reporting on three sets of 
experimental findings ) .  
·'6 See notes 62-63 and accompanying text . 
"7 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Be­
haviorol Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw U L Rev 135, 1 84-86 (2002) ( advo­
cating the rethinking of materiality in the context of open-market securities fraud) .  
"'  17 CFR § 230.408 (2002) .  
·'' 17 CFR § 240 . 1 2b-20 (2002) .  
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tions 11 and 12( a ) (2 )  of the Securities Act and Rule l Ob -S of the Secu­
rities Exchange Act, in particular insider trading cases .60 Regulation 
FD prohibits the selective disclosure of material, non-public infor­
mation by issuers of securities .61 
Rule 405 of the Securities Act defines " [t ]he term 'material/ when 
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to 
any subject, limits the information required to those matters to which 
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would at­
tach importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered.'' 62 The United States Supreme Court adopted this as the 
standard for materiality: " there must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the rea­
sonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of in­
formation made available."63 
Such a materiality standard raises the question of who is a reason­
able investor? The definition of materiality for contingent or specu­
lative information which the United States Supreme Court adopted 
sheds light on who the United States Supreme Court believes is a rea­
sonable investor.6 4 The United States Supreme Court adopted the 
Second Circuit's probability/magnitude approach, which states that 
materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both 
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the antici­
pated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company 
activity"6 5 In other words, when it comes to information concerning 
securities investment risks, the United States Supreme Court adopted 
a materiality standard that focuses exclusively on the probability and 
magnitude of the risky outcome. Earlier in that opinion cited by the 
United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S .  224, 
238 ( 1988 L the Second Circuit states that: 
" [t ]he speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are 
also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection 
afforded conservative traders ." Thus, material facts include not 
only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a 
company but also those facts which affect the probable future of 
the company and those which may affect the desire of investors 
to buy; sell, or hold the company's securities."66 
6015 USC § §  77k, 771, 1 7  CFR § 240 . 1 0b-5 (2002) .  
(, J  17 CFR § 243 . 1 00- 1 03 (2002 ) .  
62 17 CFR § 230.405 (2002) .  
r,; T S C  Industries, Inc v Northway, Inc, 426 US 438, 449 ( 1 976 ) .  
6• Basic Inc v Levinson, 4 8 5  U S  224, 239 ( 1 988 ) .  
6·' SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co, 401 F2d 833, 849 (2d Cir  1968 ) .  
66 Id at 849. 
I 
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The court quoted a defendant's expert witness in a footnote to the 
above quoted passage: 
" [ t]he intelligent speculator assumes that facts are available 
for a thorough analysis . The speculator then examines the facts 
to discover and evaluate the risks that are present. He then bal­
ances these risks against the apparent opportunities for capital 
gains and makes his decision accordingly. He is, to the best of 
his ability, taking calculated risks." 
This description of how an intelligent speculator behaves remains 
that of a person who cognitively evaluates and calculates securities 
risks as opposed to reacts moodily and perhaps unconsciously to se­
curities risks . 
A response to rethinking the notions of materiality and reasonable 
investor behavior is that many courts appear to view the reasonable 
investor as referring to a normative idealized type of behavior, instead 
of a descriptive realistic depiction of actual behavior. But, if this is the 
case, one can question whether the practice of courts continuing to 
utilize such a definition of reasonable investor and the related stan­
dard of materiality is relevant or appropriate.67 Courts have not elim­
inated and will not even necessarily reduce moody investing simply 
by holding that moody investing behavior is not reasonable, espe­
cially if moody investing is prevalent and unconscious .68 It is also un­
clear whether moody investing behavior is unreasonable, both de­
scriptively and normatively. 
A different response to rethinking the financial model of reason­
able investor behavior is that one should apply that model not liter­
ally, but instead figuratively. In other words, the reasonable investor 
model is a metaphor which provides a useful framework that enables 
us to understand securities markets better than without such a 
metaphor. Indeed, the same has been said of two well-known quanti­
tative financial valuation models, namely the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model and the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model.69 While the rea­
sonable investor model is certainly a useful metaphor, this Article 
67 Langevoort, Taming the Animal at 186 (cited in note 5 7 )  (arguing that the defini­
tion of materiality should be tied to commonplace as opposed to idealized investor 
behavior) .  
r, s  See Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Un­
conscious 130  (Belknap, 2002) ( discussing empirical and experimental evidence from 
social psychology that "people can possess one feeling while believing they have 
another " ) .  See also Piotr Winkielman and Kent C. Berridge, Unconscious Emotion, 1 3  
Current Directions Psychol Sci 1 20 (2004 ) .  
m Elton G .  McCoun, Finance Models as  Metaphors, 1 2  Intl Rev Fin Analysis 421, 
422-26, 432 (2003 ). 
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will argue that the moody investing model provides a more accurate 
metaphor. 
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the materiality of in­
formation which focuses on the magnitude of the risky outcomes and 
on the degree or vividness of mental imagery. Such a reformulation of 
materiality suggests that an emotionally rich presentation of infor­
mation can be material while a less emotionally vivid presentation of 
the same cognitive information can be immaterial. In other words, de­
terminations of materiality would and should depend not just on the 
cognitive form and content of information, but also upon the affec­
tive form or presentation and emotional content of that information. 
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the reasonableness 
of investors which does not privilege cognition over affect, but in­
stead acknowledges the reasonableness of some moods in certain sit­
uations. Such a reformulation of reasonableness implies that drawing 
a hard and fast line between cognition and emotion is artificial, if not 
impossible. In other words, determinations of reasonableness would 
and should depend not just on the cognitive nature and quality of in­
formation processing, but also upon the affective nature and quality 
of information processing. 
IV. T H E  AFFECT OF P UFFERY 
Under the United States federal securities laws, secuntles issuers 
have no duty to disclose any material nonpublic information they 
posses just because that information is material unless they have an 
independent duty to disclose that information . 70 But if and once an 
issuer of securities chooses to make voluntary disclosures, that issuer 
has a duty to speak completely. 7 1  In other words, there is a half-truth 
doctrine, under which statements that are literally true but omit 
some material fact, thereby making them misleading, are actionable 
under the federal securities laws . 72 In addition, some courts find that 
if a securities issuer chooses to make voluntary forward-looking dis­
closures, a securities issuer also has a duty to update those forward­
looking statements to reflect any subsequent developments as long 
as the original disclosures remain alive in the securities market­
place. 73 But, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act added to the Se-
70 Basic Inc v Levinson. 485 US 224, 239 n. 1 7  ( 1988 ); Glazer v Formica Corp, 964 F2d 
149, 1 5 7  ( 2d Cir 1992); and Backman v Polaroid, 9 1 0  F2d 10, 12 ( l st Cir 1990) ( en bane ) .  
7 1  First Virginia Bankshares v Benson, 559 F2d 1307, 1 3 1 4  (5th Cir  1977 ), cert. de­
nied, 435 US 952 ( 1 978 )  
72 See generally Donald C.  Langevoort, Half-Tru ths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences 
by Investors and Others. 52 Stan L Rev 8 7  ( 1 999) ( discussing the half-truth doctrine) .  
n Greenfield v Heublein, Inc, 742 F2d 75 1 ,  758 (3rd Cir 1984);  In re Time- Warner 
Securities Litigation, 9 F3d 259, 268 (2d Cir 1993 ); In re Bmlington Coat Factory Se-
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curities Exchange Act a new Section 13 ( 1 )  that mandates real time 
disclosures of "additional information concerning material changes 
in the financial condition or operations of" securities issuers . 74 
Rule l Ob-S prohibits material misrepresentations and omissions. 75 
A crucial issue for a successful Rule l Ob-S claim is whether the state­
ments made were material . But, materiality is a complex notion. In 
particular, "projections and statements of optimism may trigger lia­
bility under federal securities laws ." 76 But such statements may also 
fall under the protection of the so-called puffery defense or puffery 
doctrine. Under the puffery defense, statements that are too vague, 
promotional, or hyperbolic, constitute mere puffery and are therefore 
immaterial as a matter of law. 77 The puffery doctrine is closely related 
to the half-truth doctrine, under which there is a duty to speak com­
pletely if one chooses to speak. 78 The puffery doctrine is also closely 
related to so-called puffery claims arising in Federal Trade Commis­
sion (FTC ) regulation of consumer product advertising/9 cases of 
FTC enforcement prosecutions against deceptive advertising;80 and 
the FTC's Policy Statement on DeceptionY 
curities Litigation, 1 1 4 F3d 1 4 10, 1 432 (3d Cir 1997);  and Weiner v Quaker Oats Co, 
1 29 F3d 3 10, 3 1 8  (3d Cir 1977 ) .  
7 "  1 5  USCA § 78 . 13 (1 )  (2003 ) .  
7 0  l 7  CFR § 240 . l 0b-5 (2002) .  
7 6  In re Syntex Cor. Securities Litigation, 855 F Supp 1086, 1 096 ( ND Cal l 994 ) .  See 
also In re Apple Compu ter Securities Litigation, 886 F2d 1 1 09, 1 1 1 3  (9th Cir 1989); 
Marx v Computer Sciences Corp, 507 F2d 485, 492 (9th Cir 1974); and G etJ M, Inc v 
Newbern, 488 F2d 742, 746 (9th Cir 1973 ) .  
7 7  Note, Securities Fraud o r  Mere Puffery: R efinement of the Corporate Puffery De­
fense, 5 1  Vand L Rev 1049, 1 055-92 ( 1998 )  ( discussing the puffery defense) .  
7 s  Langevoort, Half Tnzths at 121 -24 (cited in note 72) ( discussing the close relation­
ship between the puffery or general optimism doctrine and the half-truth doctrine ) .  
7 9  See generally Ivan L Preston, The Great American Blow- Up: Puffery in Adver­
tising and Selling (Wisconsin 2d ed, 1996); Ivan L Preston, The Tangled Web They 
Weave: Tnz th, Falsity and Advertisers (Wisconsin, 1996); Terence A. Shrimp, A dver­
tising, Promotion, and Supplemental Aspects of Integrated Marketing Communica­
tion (SW College 6th ed, 2003 ) .  
� o  See, for example, Florence Mfg Co v ! C. Dowel etJ Co, 1 78 F 73, 75 (2nd Cir  191 0 )  
( s tating that " [t ]he law is not made for experts but t o  protect the public,-that vast mul­
titude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making 
purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general 
impressions" ); Aronberg v FTC, 132 F2d 165, 1 67 ( 7th Cir 1942) ( stating " the buying 
public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each word in an advertisement" and 
that " [a]dvertisements are intended not 'to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at 
hand, but rather to produce an impression upon' prospective purchasers" ( quoting New­
ton Tea etJ Spice Co v United States, 288 F 475, 479 (6th Cir 1923 ) ) ); Standard Oil Co of 
California v FTC, 5 7 7  F2d 653, 659 (9th Cir 1 978 ) ( stating " that commercial messages 
might lead the average viewer, in his anxiety . . .  to overreact even though upon careful 
reflection he might see for himself the limitations inherent in the advertiser's claim" ) . 
� �  An advertisement is deceptive when there is "a misrepresentation, omission or 
other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to 
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The FTC's Policy Statement on Deception states that an adver­
tisement is deceptive when there is " a  misrepresentation, omission 
or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in 
the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment ." 82 The FTC also reg­
ulates what advertisements do not say, that is, when they omit mate­
rial information that affects a consumer's decision to purchase the 
advertised goods or services . In deceptive advertising claims by com­
petitors,83 and trademark infringement claims under the Lanham 
Act;84 courts already adopt empirical survey evidence and expert wit­
ness testimony in determining consumers' perceptions .  85 Two legal 
scholars proposed that courts utilize measurable survey evidence to 
determine the actual perceptions of symbolic government action en­
dorsing religion and in so doing test for violations of the Establish­
ment Clause of the First Amendment.86 Similarly, this Article sug­
gests that moody investing also argues for courts adopting survey 
evidence to determine if puffery affects moods and in so doing, secu­
rities investing. Of course, there must be established protocols and 
procedures for conducting surveys . Some legal scholars and econo­
mists have questioned the nature and reliability of survey data from 
contingent valuation methodology.87 Also, economists historically 
are suspicious of the meaning and veracity of survey data (preferring 
to make statistical inferences from observable quantitative market 
data by econometric methods ) . 88 
the consumer's detriment." Policy Statement on Deception, 4 Trade Reg Rep (CCH) 
<j] 1 3, 205 at 20, 9 1 7  (FTC Oct.  1 4, 1 983) .  In determining if an advertisement deceives 
consumers, the FTC asks what does the advertisement say or imply, and does the ad­
vertisement have a reasonable basis for its claims ' 
ol Policy Statement on Deception, 4 Trade Reg Rep ( CCH) <J] 1 3, 205 at 20, 9 1 7  (FTC 
Oct . 1 4, 1 983) .  To determine if an advertiser has deceived consumers, the FTC con­
ducts a two-part analysis: ( 1 )  What does the advertisement say or imply? and (2) Does 
the advertiser have a reasonable basis for its claims ?  
x.l 1 5  USC § 1 125(a) ( l )(B ) .  
x 4  15  USC § 1 05 1 et seq ( 1 994 ) .  
xo See, for example, Southland Sod Farms v Stover Seed Co. 1 08 F3d 1 1 34, 1 1 40 (9th 
Cir 1 997) ( "Reactions of the public are typically tested through the use of consumer 
surveys -" ) ; and Qualitex Co v Jacobson Prods. Co, No CV-90- 1 1 83HLH, 199 1  Dist. 
LEXIS 2 1 1 72, at * 1 4- 1 5  (CD Cal 1 99 1 ), aff'd in part & rev'd on other grounds, 13 F3d 
1 297, rev'd, 5 1 4 US 1 59 ( 1 995 ) (finding that surveys are relevant on the issue of likeli­
hood of confusion) .  
H r>  Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 
Md L Rev 7 1 2, 7 1 6  (200 1 ) . 
07 See generally Jerry A. Hausman, ed, Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assess­
ment (North-Holland, 1993 ) .  
sx See, for example, Fritz Machlup, Marginal Analysis and Empirical R esearch . 36 
Am Econ Rev 5 1 9 ( 1 946) ( arguing that people do not know their own motivations, so 
what people say about themselves should not be taken seriously) .  But see Truman 
Bewley, Interviews as a Valid Empirical Tool in Economics, 3 1  J Socio-Econ 343, 344-
52 (2002) ( describing sampling, interviewing, and data analysis methods for surveys ) .  
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To be clear, this Article is not advocating that all puffery should be 
legally actionable. For example, if a company prints the phrase, "we 
are bullish on this company's future prospects", in the company's an­
nual report distributed to existing and potential shareholders, that 
statement ought not be actionable due to it being a completely vague 
assertion concerning the future that is unlikely to induce any false 
implied meanings that directly affect investors' beliefs concerning 
that company's securities. To be legally actionable, puffery must in­
duce false implied meanings that are thus deceptive, misleading, and 
can be disproved. A central point of this Article is that social psy­
chological and marketing research demonstrates that puffery may en­
gender or generate implied meanings not only cognitively, but also 
emotionally.89 
Moody investing means that the puffery defense is flawed because 
vague, promotional, or hyperbolic statements can have real impacts 
on moods and therefore should not be deemed immaterial as a mat­
ter of law. A response to such mood impacts is that over time, people 
may learn to ignore or discount puffery. But, such a response ignores 
the fact that investors are not a fixed group, but instead consist of an 
ever-changing pool of investors, who as they become older and if 
wiser are replaced by a new cohort still wet behind the ears and ready 
to be misled emotionally.90 Also problematic for such a response is 
the vast empirical and experimental research finding that people are 
systematically wrong in their forecasts of how they will feeP1 In fact, 
"9 Shari Seidman Diamond and Linda Dimitropoulos, Deception and Puffery in 
Advertising: Behavioral Science Implications for R egulation, 23-24 Am B Found 
Working Paper # 9 1 05 ( 1 994) ( discussing early empirical evidence that puffery can be 
persuasive as a peripheral cue in addition to cognitive information ) .  See also Raymond 
R. Burke, et al, Deception by Implication: An Experimental Investigation, 14 J Con­
sumer Rsrch 483, 486-91 ( 1998)  ( presenting laboratory evidence that expansions of lit­
erally true claims in advertisements increased false brand attributes, affect, and pur­
chase intentions compared to control conditions ) .  
90 Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos, 8 1  Va L Rev 6 1 1 ,  637-40 ( 1 995 ) 
( making a similar argument about what happens when "Darwin Meets Barnum " ) .  
9 1  Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and t h e  Emotions: T h e  Problems of Affective Fore­
casting 80 Indiana L J ( forthcoming 2004) ( reviewing this literature and exploring its le­
gal policy implications ); Christopher K. Hsee and Jiao Zhang, Distinction Bias. Mis­
prediction and Mischoice Due to Joint Evaluation, 86 J Personality & Soc Psychol 680, 
683-90 (2004) (demonstrating experimentally that people often make predictions and 
choices in the joint evaluation mode, but actually undergo experiences in the separate 
or single evaluation mode); Christopher K. Hsee, et al, Lay R ationalism and Inconsis­
tency between Predicted Experience and Decision, 16 J Behav Dec Making 25 7, 259-
67 (2003 ) ( presenting evidence that decision-makers systematically overweight cold ra­
tionalistic factors and underweight hot affective factors ); Christopher K. Hsee, et at 
Medium Maximization, 30 J Consumer Rsrch 1, 4 - 1 1 ( reporting on experimental stud­
ies finding that people have a tendency to base their decisions on specious immediate 
payoffs instead of the ultimate consequences of their actions); George Loewenstein 
and Daniel Adler, Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, l OS Econ J 929 ( 1 995 ) 
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people are often unconscious of how they feel .92 Cognitive biases and 
heuristics provide a different set of non-moody reasons for question­
ing the puffery defense .93 
Recently, appellate courts in virtually every federal circuit court 
have utilized the puffery defense to dismiss private securities fraud 
actions based upon vague statements of corporate optimism.94 Courts 
have also utilized the puffery defense to dismiss private securities 
fraud actions against brokers.95 But, securities customers may be 
more trusting of and so more subject to securities brokers engaging in 
puffery to induce moody investing than securities customers are in 
danger of securities issuers engaging in puffery to induce moody in­
vesting. Securities customers may feel they are closer to and have 
more of a personal relationship with their securities brokers than 
with the issuers of securities. On the other hand, that p erceived close­
ness and personal relationship could also mean that securities cus­
tomers will come to appreciate the degree to which their securities 
(presenting evidence that people fail to predict their future utility) ;  George Loewen­
stein, et al, The Effect of Sexual  Arousal on Expecta tions of Sexua l  Forcefulness, 34 
J Rsrch Crime & Delinq 443, 445-47 ( 1 997)  ( examining how young males in various 
states of sexual arousal predict incorrectly how coercive they will be in sexual set­
tings ) ;  George Loewenstein and David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice! Predicting Fu­
tme Feelings in Daniel Kahneman, et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedo­
nic Psychology 85, 88- 1 00 ( Russell Sage, 1 999) (reviewing empirical evidence that 
people make errors in predicting their feelings, discussing the sources of such errors, 
and considering policy implications) ;  Leaf Van Boven and George Loewenstein, Social 
Projection of Transient Visceral Feelings. 29 Personality & Soc Psychol Bull 1 1 59 
(2003 ) (documenting that people have difficulty while in a hot stat e  imagining them­
selves to be in a cold state); and George Loewenstein, et al, Projection Bias in Predicting 
Future Utility, 1 1 8 Q J Econ 1 209, 1 2 1 2- 1 6  (2003 ) (presenting and reviewing evidence 
from a variety of domains that people systematically underestimate the magnitude of 
changes in their future tastes ) .  See also Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Imm une Neglect: A 
Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Soc Psychol 6 1 7, 
620-36 ( 1998)  ( discussing experimental evidence that people misestimate the duration 
of their future feelings ) ;  Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Durability Bias in Affective Forecast­
ing, in Gilovic, Heuristics and Biases at 292, 297-3 1 2  (cited in note 40) ( same); and 
Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecast­
ing of Future Affective States in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and Thinking: The Role of 
Affect in Social Cognition 1 78, 1 85 -94 ( Cambridge, 2000) (discussing research findings ) .  
9 2  Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves a t  1 1 7-35 ( cited i n  note 68 )  ( discussing research 
findings that people do not know how they feel) .  
"3 Langevoort, Taming the Anim al Spirits a t  1 84-86 ( cited i n  note 5 7 )  ( questioning 
the cognitive applicability of the puffery defense in the context of open-market secu­
rities fraud) .  
"" Jennifer O'Hare, The R esurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate R e-emergence 
of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 Ohio St L J 1 697, 1 708-
15 ( 1 998) (documenting the prevalence of appellate courts accepting the puffery doc­
trine to dismiss private securities fraud cases ) .  
9·' I d  a t  1 708 fns 47-5 1 ( citing and discussing such cases ) .  
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brokers engage in puffery. Furthermore, there is a standard refrain 
that if there are long-term relationships between securities brokers 
and securities customers, securities brokers who are not myopic are 
unlikely to engage in harmful puffery because of the value of repeated 
interaction and their market reputations . In fact, the SEC has been 
unwilling to dismiss enforcement actions against brokers based upon 
the puffery defense, holding that the puffery defense does not apply 
to such securities contexts . 96 
The problem with judicial early dismissal of a securities puffery 
case as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b ) ( 6 )  
or at  summary j udgment is that a reasonable jury might have de­
cided differently had that jury been given the opportunity to do so .  
In other words, moody investing suggests that in terms of institu­
tional competence, juries may possess a comparative advantage over 
judges in being able to determine if puffery affects moods and in so 
doing, securities investing. Several circuits hold that puffery is not 
sufficiently definitive to give rise to any § l O(b )  liability.97 Similarly, 
several courts have held that forward-looking statements are imma­
terial and therefore harmless unless they rise to the level of a guaran-
% In the Matter of George f. Kolar, No 3-95 70, 1999 SEC LEXIS 2300, * 79 n.3 l ( Oct.  
28, 1999) (stating the "Commission has not generally been hospitable to claims that 
statements made by a registered representative in the course of customer solicitation 
are 'mere puffery ' ." ) ;  and Id at 1 708 fn 56 ( citing and discussing other such enforcement 
actions ) .  
Y ?  The Second Circuit held that "soft" statements of general optimism or "puffery 
cannot have misled a reasonable investor . . .  and cannot constitute actionable state­
ments under the securities laws." San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Shar­
ing Plan v Philip Morris Co, Inc, 75 F3d 801 ,  8 1 1  ( 2d Cir 1996) .  The Second Circuit also 
held that a statement that diversification will result in continued prosperity, when that 
statement is made with the knowledge that such a plan will actually reduce profits is 
"precisely the type of 'puffery' that this and other circuits have consistently held to be 
inactionable." Lasker v New York State  Electric f!) Gas Corp, 85 F3d 55, 59 ( 2d Cir 
1 996 ) .  The Third Circuit held that '"[s]oft,' 'puffing' statements . . .  generally lack ma­
teriality." In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 1 1 4  F3d 1 4 1 0, 1 427-28 
(3d Cir 1997) .  The Fourth Circuit held that a company's predictions in its annual report 
that management believed that it could continue to grow net earnings at faster rate 
than sales were too vague to be material. R aab v General Physics Corp, 4 F3d 286, 289-
90 (4th Cir 1993 ) .  The Fifth Circuit stated that, " [p]rojections of future performance 
not worded as guarantees are generally not actionable under the federal securities 
laws ." Krim v BancTexas Group, Inc, 989 F2d 1 435,  1 446 (5 th Cir 1993 ) ( citing Fried­
m an v Mohasco Corp, 929 F2d 77 (2d Cir 199 1 )  and Hershfang v Citicorp, 767 F Supp 
1 25 1 (SD NY 199 1 ) ) .  The Seventh Circuit held that such promotional statements as 
"describing a company as 'recession-resistant' lacks the requisite specificity to be con­
sidered anything but optimistic rhetoric." Searls v Glasser, 64 F3d 106 1 ,  1 066 ( 7th Cir 
1995 ) .  The Seventh Circuit also held that " [w]here puffing is the order of the day, literal 
truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of letters of recommen­
dation well know. Mere sales puffery is not actionable under Rule l Ob-S ." Eisenstadt v 
Centel Corp, 1 13 F3d 738, 746 ( 7th Cir 1997) .  
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tee.98 Both notions of a virtual guarantee being a prerequisite to ma­
teriality are problematic in light of empirical and experimental evi­
dence that moody reactions to risk are insensitive to probability vari­
ations . 
In summary, moody investing means that the puffery defense and 
the virtual guarantor test for the materiality of forward-looking state­
ments are flawed because they are based upon only cognitive reac­
tions to financial risks and information. So-called mere puffery may 
nonetheless be material because of the positive, strong moods that it 
evokes . Forward-looking statements that do not rise to the level of a 
virtual guarantee may nonetheless instill and infuse their listeners 
with euphoric moods that are not sensitive to probability variations . 
The legal and policy implication of the literature about decision­
making and moods is that unquestioning judicial acceptance of the 
so-called puffery defense is unwarranted. 
V. " TOTAL MIX " VERSUS " TOTAL AFFECT " 
OF INFORMATION 
In articulating the standard for materiality, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that "there must be a substantial likelihood that the dis­
closure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information 
made available."99 The phrase " total mix" of information raises the 
questions of just what is the mix of information that is available and 
whether that mix should or does include information that is already 
out there in the marketplace. 
In particular, the truth-on-the-market defense argues that an is­
suer's statements or omissions cannot be misleading if there already 
is countervailing information, such as analysts' reports, in the public 
domain that is therefore part of the "total mix" of information that 
is available. 100 The metaphor of the "total mix" of information sug­
gests many individual cognitive evaluations of pieces of information 
9� Hillson Partners Ltd Partnership v Adage, Inc, 42 F3d 204, 2 1 6  (4th Cir 1 994 ) 
(holding statements that " [t]he executive is looking for 1992 sales of about $ 1 00 mil­
lion and 1 993 sales of about $ 1 1 0  million" are immaterial because these " statements 
are obviously not guarantees" )i Glasser, 64 F3d at 1 06 7  ( holding that "predictions of 
'high' disposition gains cannot be held sufficiently definite so as to constitute material 
misstatements of fact" li In re Browning-Ferris Indus . Inc. Sec. Litigation, 876  F Supp 
8 70, 897 ( SD Tex 1995 ) (finding statements that predict growth but "not worded as 
guarantees, are not actionable under the federal securities laws" )i R a a b, 4 F3d at 289-
90 ( same)i Lasker, F3d at 59 ( sameb and Krim v BancTexas Group, Inc, 989 F2d 1 446 
(5 th Cir 1993 ) ( same). 
99 TSC Industries, Inc v Northway, Inc, 426 US 438, 449 ( 1976 ). 
1 00 Wieglos v Commonwealth Edison Co, 892 F2d 509, 5 1 6  ( 7th Cir 1 989) .  
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being added up into an overall cognitive evaluation of the " total mix" 
of information . This cognitive aggregation can be performed by secu­
rities market prices and/or by individuals. 
Thus, a truth-on-the-market defense might be premised on the hy­
pothesis that securities markets are informationally efficient in the 
semi-strong sense, meaning that competitive market equilibrium se­
curities prices encapsulate the entire " total mix" of information that 
is publicly available in the sense of being sufficient statistics for that 
aggregate information. 1 0 1 Theoretical financial economic models 
demonstrate conditions under which securities market equilibrium 
prices can aggregate initially dispersed information . 102 But, there are 
no corresponding results about securities market prices aggregating 
cognitive evaluations of risk and emotional reactions to risk or even 
just aggregating different categories and valences of emotional reac­
tions to risk. 
On the other hand, a truth-on-the-market doctrine might be 
premised upon individuals cognitively aggregating different sources 
of information. 1 03 But, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
"not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. If it 
would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one 
and the other, whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and 
liability should follow." 104 In another case, a court found unconvinc­
ing in certain contexts the above scenario of individuals locating, 
reading, processing, and cognitively evaluating other information be­
sides an issuer's disclosures .  1 05 
1 0 1  Id at 5 1 6. See also In re Apple Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F2d 1 1 09, 
1 1 1 4  (9th Cir 1989) ( stating that " it is a basic assumption of the securities laws that the 
partially-informed investors will cancel each other out, and that Apple's stock price 
will accurately reflect all relevant information") ;  In re Convergent Technologies Se­
curities Litigation, 948 F2d 507, 5 13 (9th Cir 1991 )  ( same); Phillips v L CI Intern .. Inc. 
190 F3d 609, 6 1 7  (4th Cir 1999) ( same); and Longman v Food Lion. Inc, 197 F3d 6 75, 
685 (4th Cir 1999) (same). 
1 0 2  See, for example, Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E Stiglitz, Information and 
Competitive Price Systems, 66 Am Econ Rev 246 ( 1 976)  (providing such results); San­
ford J .  Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When Investors 
Have Diverse Inform ation, 3 1  J Fin 5 73 ( 1 976) ( same); Sanford J. Grossman, Further 
Results on the Informational Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When In­
vestors Have Diverse Information. 1 8  J Econ. Theory 8 1  ( 1978 ) ( same); Sanford J .  
Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory of R ational Expectations Under Asym­
metric Information, 48 Rev Econ Stud 5 4 1  ( 198 1 )  ( same ); and Roy Radner, R ational Ex­
pectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices, 
47 Econometrica 655 ( 1 979) ( same) .  
1 01  See, for example, Rodman v Grant Foundation, 608 F2d 64, 70 ( CA NY 1979); 
Seibert v Sperry R and Corp, 586 F2d 949, 952 (2d Cir 1978 ) .  
1 04 Virginia Bankshares, Inc v Sandberg, S O l  US 1083, 1 097 ( 1991 ). 
1 0" United Paperworkers International Union v International Paper Co, 985 F2d 
1 190 (2d Cir 1993 ) .  
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But, even reasonable investors will neither cognitively evaluate, 
nor emotionally react to items that are not part of the " total mix" of 
information. But, even for items that are in the " total mix" of infor­
mation, the "total affect" of information differs from the "total mix" 
of that information in the cognitive sense. Moody investing means 
that emotionally neutral items in the "total mix" of information may 
not have much impact. For example, investors are likely to ignore 
boilerplate that is presented in an emotionally neutral fashion. Psy­
chological experiments about how people form global retrospective 
evaluations of affective experiences felt over time find that people do 
not simply add up their moment-by-moment affective experiences. 106 
Instead, people utilize a peak-and-end rule, whereby they focus on 
the peak and end affective levels . An open empirical question is 
whether the same is true of mood responses to information. 
Another open empirical question is whether or to what extent even 
emotionally negative information sufficiently offsets the impact of 
emotionally positive information or other optimistic information. 
There is cognitive psychological evidence that our minds absorb in­
formation first from images, second from sounds, and third from 
texts.  107 This evidence suggests that emotionally negative images or 
pictures ( such as televised press conferences) are likely to have the 
most impact, followed by emotionally negative audio recordings ( such 
as radio broadcasts or internet webcasts ) , with emotionally negative 
documents or written information ( such as press releases or newspa­
per articles ) least likely to offset emotionally positive statements. 
Recent marketing research finds television commercials involving 
conflicting emotions result in less favorable attitudes by viewers with 
a lower propensity to accept duality, such as Anglo Americans or 
younger adults than viewers with a higher propensity to accept duality, 
such as Asian Americans and older adults . 108 Can and should securi-
1 0" See, for example, Barbara L .  Frederickson, Extrac ting Meaning from Past Affec­
tive Experiences: The Importance of Peaks, Ends and Specific Emotions, 1 4  C ognition 
& Emotion 5 77 ( 2000); Barbara L. Frederickson and Daniel Kahneman, Duration Ne­
glect in R etrospective Evaluations of Affective Episodes. 65 J Personality & Soc Psy­
cho! 45 ( 1993 ); Daniel Kahneman, et al, When More Pain is Preferred to  Less: A dding 
a Better End, 4 Psycho! Sci 40 1 ( 1 993 ); Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Pa­
tients' Memories of Painful Medical Treatments: R eal-time and R etrospective Evalu­
ations of Two Minim ally Invasive Procedures, 66 Pain 3 ( 1996 );  Carol Varey and Dan­
iel Kahneman, Experiences Extended Across Time: Evalu ation of Moments and 
Episodes, 5 J Behav Decision Making 1 69 ( 1992 ) .  
1 07 Paul Tulenko, Traditional Ways to Advertise Work Well ·with Updated Ideas, 
Milwaukee J & Sentinel at 2D ( Oct.  23, 2000). 
1 0B Patti A. Williams and Jennifer L .  Aaker, Can Mixed Emotions Peacefully Co­
Exist!, 28 J Consumer Rsrch 636, 639-48 (2002)  ( reporting on experiments concerning 
the psychological impact of mixed emotions on attitudes ) .  See also G. Douglas Olsen 
and John W. Pracejus, Integration of Positive and Negative Affective Stimuli, 14 J Con-
Peter H. Huang 1 2 1  
ties regulations differentiate among emotional appeals made to demo­
graphic subgroups of society by age, culture, ethnicity; or sex in light 
of Constitutional equal protection issues raised by these research 
findings that consumer processing of mixed emotional appeals varies 
by age, culture, and situations ? 1 09 What are the legal implications of 
the finding that emotional responses can interact with one another? 1 1 0 
It is unclear from cognitive psychology whether the SEC should 
mandate the order of presenting positive information and negative 
information. On the one hand, the contrast effect finds that "infor­
mation that is presented against a contrasting background is often 
perceived disproportionately." 1 1 1  This suggests requiring positive in­
formation precede negative information so that the latter can stand 
out in contrast to the former. In addition, the "recentness effect" sug­
gests that the last piece of information that a person hears is the most 
accessible piece of information for that person. On the other hand, 
the primacy effect suggests requiring negative information precede 
positive information because information presented first tends to 
have more influence on forming an overall impression than informa­
tion presented later. m In addition, the priming effect suggests that 
initial information affects and conditions the interpretation of sub­
sequent information . 1 1 3 Overall, the availability heuristic suggests 
that whatever piece of information becomes uppermost in the minds 
of an audience, whether due to primacy; recentness, typicality; or 
some other such effect, is perceived disproportionately and comes to 
carry more weight than less activated pieces of information . 1 1 4 
In summary; moody investing means that the "total affect" of in­
formation can and will differ from the 11 total mix11 of that informa­
tion in the cognitive sense. Although a cognitive evaluation for the 
" total mix11 of information may integrate various cognitive evalua­
tions of distinct items of information, it is an open empirical ques­
tion if, how, or to what extent individuals or securities market prices 
sumer Psychol ( forthcoming, 2004) ( reporting on two experiments investigating how 
positive and negative affective stimuli combine to influence overall affective responses 
to an advertisement, content-specific beliefs, and overall evaluations) .  
1o9 Id. 
1 1 0  Jennifer Edson Escalas and Barbara B. Stern, Sympathy and Empathy· Emotional 
R esponses to Advertising Dramas, 29 J Consumer Rsrch 566, 5 70-76 (2003 ) ( reporting 
on two experiments) . 
1 1 1  Joachim Goldberg and Rudiger von Nitzsch, Beh avioral Finance 4 1  ( John Wiley 
& Sons, 200 1 ) .  
1 1 2  Elliot Aronson, The Social Anim al 1 29-3 1  (WH Freeman 6th ed, 1 992)  (describ­
ing and explaining the primacy effect in impression formation). 
1 u Id at 1 24-26 ( describing and explaining the priming effect in impression forma­
tion); Goldberg and Von Nitzsch, Beh avioral Finance at 43-44 (cited in note 1 1 1  ) . 
1 1 "'  Goldberg and Von Nitzsch, Behavioral Finance at 3 7-39 ( cited in note 1 1 1 )  ( dis­
cussing the availability heuristic ) .  
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amalgamate cognitive evaluations of and emotional reactions to in­
formation. It is also unclear how various emotional reactions to dis­
tinct items of information come together to form an overall emotional 
reaction for the "total mix" of information. Despite these uncertain­
ties, which suggest further specific areas for additional empirical and 
theoretical researchi the legal and policy implication of current em­
pirical and theoretical knowledge about moody decision-making is to 
modify the " total mix" analysis of materiality to include investiga­
tion of the "total affect" of information. Such an inquiry may sound 
murky; but given that the " total mix" analysis is already murky; the 
incremental murkiness from investigating " total affect" should be 
manageable. In addition, this inquiry does not have to rely solely on 
the introspection of judges or juries, but can and should benefit from 
empirical surveys of investors and expert witness testimony by econ­
omists, social psychologists, and marketing professors. In particular, 
potential defendants can and should achieve some degree of protec­
tion from legal liability by having social psychologists and marketing 
firms conduct empirical survey research concerning the likely " total 
affect" of information regarding an issuer's securities . 
VI. H O W  AFFECTIVE AND EFFECTIVE IS 
MEANING FU L CAUTIONARY LANGUAG E ?  
The judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine protects opti­
mistic forward-looking statements including forecasts, projections, 
and opinions from allegations of misrepresentation and omission 
when those statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
language . 1 1 5 Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, forward-looking 
statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language are 
deemed to be immaterial . Courts have utilized the "bespeaks cau­
tion" doctrine to rule on the pleadings as a matter of law; usually by 
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion 
for summary judgment . 
By offering protection from liability; the "bespeaks caution" doc­
trine provides another incentive for issuers and others to make soft 
information available to investors . 1 1 6 The same incentive effect ap-
1 1 ' See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures That "Bespeak Caution. " 49 
Bus Law 48 1 ( 1994) (analyzing three variations of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, iden­
tifying two distinct, but related rationales for the doctrine and proposing refinement 
of the doctrine); and Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: 
It 's Not Just A State of Mind, 5 8  U Pitt L Rev 6 1 9 ( 1 997 )  (discussing alternative legal 
rationales courts have utilized in developing the "bespeaks caution" doctrine ) .  
1 1 6 Langevoort, Disclosmes a t  499 (cited i n  note 1 1 5 )  (noting that a virtue o f  the "be­
speaks caution" doctrine is that it encourages companies and promoters to  disclose 
more information to investors ) .  
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plies to statutory safe harbors that codify the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine . 1 1 7 Historically, both the courts and the SEC consistently 
prohibited or at least discouraged issuers of securities from providing 
soft information. 1 1 8 One rationale for this hostility to soft informa­
tion was the SEC's inability to review the accuracy of such hard-to­
verify information and fears that ( especially unsophisticated) investors 
would place undue reliance on soft information. 1 1 9  But, in 1 978, the 
SEC adopted Securities Act Rule 1 75 and Securities Exchange Act 
Rule 3b-6, 120 which provide safe harbors for certain forward-looking 
statements in SEC filings by issuers of securities. In addition, the SEC 
mandates the disclosure of " known trends or uncertainties " reason­
ably expected to have material impact on the financial condition of 
a company in the management discussion and analysis ( MD &A )  
section o f  such required SEC filings a s  prospectuses and annual 
reports .  1 2 1 
The phrase "bespeaks caution" is from a case in which a court held 
that certain statements "bespeak caution in outlook and fall far short 
of the assurances required for a finding of falsity and fraud." 1 22 In that 
securities fraud case alleging intentional misrepresentations in an of­
fering memorandum, the court held that such allegations did not sur­
vive a motion to dismiss because the memorandum also contained 
accompanying cautionary language . 1 23 The court stated that: "We are 
not inclined to impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly 
'bespeak caution ."' 1 24 
A leading case of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine involved an offer­
ing of $675 million in bonds by Donald Trump and a partnership to fi­
nance the completion of the Taj Mahal casino/hotel in Atlantic City. 1 25 
1 1 7  Marilyn F. Johnson, et al, The Impoct of Securities Litigotion R eform on the Dis­
closure of Forword-Looking Informotion by High-Technology Firms, 39 J Acct Rsrch 
297 (200 1 )  (finding, in a sample of 523 computer hardware, computer software, and 
pharmaceutical companies, significant increases in both the frequency of companies 
that made general qualitative financial forecasts and the mean number of forecasts a 
year after the passage of the statutory safe harbors codifying the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine, with a significant number of first-time forecasters and the greatest increases 
among companies at greatest risk of a lawsuit ) .  
1 1 '  Sec, for example, Securities Act Release No 5 180 ( Oct.  1 6, 197 1);  and Gerstle v 
Gomble-Skogmo, Inc, 478 F2d 1 28 1, 1294 (2d Cir 1973 ) .  
1 1 � See, for example, South Coast Services Corp v Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co, 
669 F2d 1265, 1270 (9th Cir 1982) .  
1 20 17 CFR § 230 . 1 75; 17 CFR § 240 . 1 3b-6; see also Securities Act Release No. 6084 
( June 25, 1979) . 
1 2 1  17 CFR § 229.303 (2002) . 
1 22 Polin v Conductron Corp, 552 F2d 797, 802 fn 28 ( 8th Cir 1977 ) .  
m Luce  v Edelstein. 802 F2d 49 (2d Cir  1986 ) .  
1 24 Id at 56.  
1 2" In re Donald f. Trump Casinos Securities Litigation-Taj Mahal Litigation. 7 F3d 
357 (3d Cir 1993 ) .  
124 Moody Investing and the Supreme Court 
The offering prospectus stated the partnership believed that revenues 
from the casino/hotel would be sufficient to cover the interest and 
principal of the bonds . The prospectus also contained numerous dis­
claimers and cautionary statements identifying risk factors and 
warned there could be no assurances that the casino/hotel would be 
profitable or that it will generate sufficient revenues to cover the debt 
service of the bonds . 
The court held that " abundant and meaningful cautionary lan­
guage" in the prospectus "not only . . .  generally convey the riskiness 
of the investment, but its warnings and cautionary language directly 
address the substance of the statement the plaintiffs challenge." 1 26 
The court also held that application of the "bespeaks caution" doc­
trine must be made on a case-by-case basis . 1 27 This court's reasoning 
that optimistic forward-looking statements are offset by " meaningful 
cautionary language" because the " total mix" of information is unaf­
fected ignores the powerful affect of such optimistic forward-looking 
statements. This court's argument suffers from the same criticisms 
that were raised in the last section about how the "total mix" analysis 
of materiality differs from the "total affect" of multiple statements.  
Despite this court fully embracing the "bespeaks caution" doc­
trine, this court did "not establish a sweeping rule that cautionary 
statements will always render misrepresentations or omissions im­
material as a matter of law." 128 Instead, the court stressed the impor­
tance of context. 129 In addition, this court held that " [ t ] o  suffice, the 
cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored to the spe­
cific future projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus the 
plain tiffs challenge." I3o 
Another leading case illustrating the "bespeaks caution" doctrine 
involved an IPO followed by a $92 million " junk bond" offering by 
Worlds of Wonder (WOW), a high-technology toy company that 
achieved quick and enormous success with its only two lines of toys : 
Teddy Ruxpin, a talking teddy bear, and Lazer Tag, an infared toy 
weapon game. 13 1  Both offering prospectuses contained warnings of 
WOW's dependence on its limited number of product lines and in­
cluded a number of other specific risk factors. The court held that 
" [ e ]stimates or forecasts of future performance in a prospectus are not 
actionable if the prospectus contains conspicuous language that be­
speaks caution as to actual results .  Furthermore, the cautionary lan-
1�" lei at 3 72. 
1 27 lcl at 3 7 l .  
1 2' Icl at 3 73 fn 16. 
12Y Icl at 3 73 . 
110 Icl at 3 7 1 -72.  
111 In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation. 8 14 F Supp 850 (ND Cal 1 993 ) .  
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guage must specifically disclose the nature and extent of the risks in­
volved." 132 But other stronger instances of the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine convey talismanic significance to boilerplate cautionary 
language that is not narrowly tailored to specific forecasts. In fact, the 
strongest example of the "bespeaks caution" doctrine involved a dis­
trict court dismissing a securities fraud claim merely because of the 
existence of such nearly boilerplate cautionary language as found in 
these quotations: "future operating results are difficult to predict and 
no representation or warranty of any kind is made," "no warranty is 
or can be made as to the future operations or of the amount of any fu­
ture income," " [t ] here is no assurance that actual events will corre­
spond with these hypothetical assumptions," and " [a]ctual results 
may or may not approximate such statements ." 133 Instead of examin­
ing the allegedly fraudulent financial forecasts carefully and in the 
context of these cautionary statements, the court simply and me­
chanically gave prominence to such broad warnings in dismissing the 
case for failure to state a claim. The decision has the feel of a judicial 
heuristic being applied merely because of its simplicity. 
Moody investing means that the "bespeaks caution" doctrine is 
problematic because meaningful cautionary language concerns the 
probability of the optimistic forward-looking statements being real­
ized. But, if those optimistic statements have induced positive moods 
or emotional reactions, such feelings are insensitive to probability 
variations. Because these positive feelings display probability insensi­
tivity, merely disclosing the low probability of success or the high prob­
ability of losses will not have much of an impact on those who experi­
ence such feelings. Thus, even cautionary language that is cognitively 
meaningful may be neither affectively nor effectively meaningful. 
Judicial explanations of why meaningful cautionary language 
should result in the dismissal of a case fall into two categories. First 
is the notion that meaningful cautionary language dilutes optimistic 
statements to such a degree that such statements are no longer opti­
mistic and so they could not mislead any reasonable investor. 1 34 Sec­
ond is the idea that cautionary language takes away the right of plain­
tiffs to rely on forward-looking statements, even if those statements 
w Id at 859 .  
1.n Schwartz v Michaels, [ 1 992 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep ljJ 96,920 ( SO N Y  July 
23, 1 992 ) .  
11 4  See, for example, I. Meyer Pincus eJ Assoc v Oppenheimer eJ Co, 936 F2d 759, 
763 ( 2d Cir 1 99 1 )  ( "statements contained within the prospectus clearly 'bespeak cau­
tion, ' rather than encouraging optimism." ); and Donald Trump, F3d at 3 73 ( "accom­
panying warnings and cautionary language served to negate any potentially mislead­
ing effect that the prospectus' statement about the Partnership's belief in its ability to 
repay the bonds would have on a reasonable investor." ) .  
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are optimistic . 1 35 Both explanations concern how a reasonable in­
vestor reacts to optimistic forward-looking information in light of 
cautionary language . Both explanations assume that a reasonable in­
vestor evaluates optimistic forward-looking information in the con­
text of cautionary language in a purely cognitive manner. In 1 994, 
there was a lack of "broad-based empirical studies that adequately de­
scribe how the normal investing population makes its investment 
decisions !' 1 36 But, we now have plenty of empirical and experimental 
evidence of moody investing. Those whose moods change in response 
to securities disclosures may still be misled by and rely on optimistic 
forward-looking information despite cautionary language. 
In fact, " the claim that reasonable investors cannot be misled by 
caution-ladden estimates and projections is probably wrong even with 
respect to the more sophisticated and rational segment of the investor 
population." 137 This is even more so with those institutional or pro­
fessional investors whose moods also change in response to estimates 
and projections . Also, "courts that rested their bespeaks caution 
analysis simply on the belief that cautionary language automatically 
negates the optimistic message otherwise contained in forward­
looking disclosures are wrong." 138 Again, this applies with even more 
force when and where investors react emotionally to forward-looking 
disclosures . Warnings of the risks and uncertainties via cautionary 
language do not necessarily displace positive affect because of the 
probability insensitivity of emotions. 
The above concerns that meaningful cautionary language may 
lack any effect on emotions apply equally to § 27 A of the Securities 
Act of 1 933, 139 and § 2 1  E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934 . 140 
These statutory safe harbors (under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1 995 14 1 ) codified the "bespeaks caution" doctrine for 
those issuers who are required to file periodic reports under the Se-
"'" See, for example, In re Integrated Resources R eal Estate Ltd Partnership Sec Litig, 
8 1 5  F Supp 620, 672 ( SD NY 1 993 ) ( "However, the warnings show that future presenta­
tions are merely projections, not statements of fact upon which the Plaintiffs can rely." ), 
appeal dismissed, 3 F3d 49 (2d Cir 1 993 ); CL- A lexanders Laing f!J Cruickshank v Gold­
feld, 739 F Supp 1 58, 1 62 (SD NY 1 990) ( " cautionary language . . .  does limit the extent 
to which a plaintiff may reasonably rely on the statements and data in the prospectus." ); 
and Friedm an v Arizona World Nurseries Ltd Par tnership, 730 F Supp 5 2 1 ,  54 1 ( SD NY 
1990) ( "warnings and disclaimers . . .  clearly limit[ed] the degree to which an investor 
could reasonably rely on these [offering] documents as a forecast of the future." ) .  
Jl(, Langevoort, Disclosures a t  492 f n  73 ( cited i n  note 1 1 5 ) .  
w Id at 494. 
' ·'x Id at 497. 
13 "  1 5  USC 77z-2 (2002 ) .  
1 40 15  USC 78u-5 ( 2002) .  
1 4 1 Pub L No 1 04-67, 1 09 Stat 73 7 (amendments codified in scattered sections of 1 5  
USC and 1 8  USC ) .  
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curities Exchange Act of 1934. These sections shield certain forward­
looking statements from private actions under the anti-fraud provi­
sions of the federal securities laws . 142 To be afforded such protection, 
a forward-looking statement must be "accompanied by meaningful 
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause 
actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking 
statement." t43 
These safe harbors extend to oral forward-looking statements . t 44 To 
be afforded such protection, an oral forward-looking statement must 
be "accompanied by a cautionary statement . . .  that actual results 
could [might ]  differ materially from those projected in the forward­
looking statement" t45 and identify "a  readily available written docu­
ment" containing "additional information concerning factors that 
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the 
forward-looking statement ." l46 In applying the safe harbor provided by 
§ 2 1 E  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1 934, t47  the Eleventh Circuit 
held that cautionary language, to be meaningful, does not have to " ex­
plicitly mention the factor that ultimately belies a forward-looking 
statement" and that "when an investor has been warned of risks of a 
significance similar to that actually realized, she is sufficiently on 
notice of the danger of the investment to make an intelligent decision 
about it according to her own preferences for risk and reward." t48 
In summary; moody investing means that even when cautionary 
language is meaningful in a cognitive sense (as opposed to being ig­
nored as boilerplate), it may be meaningless in a moody sense. The in­
sights of economic models and psychological theories about moody 
investing suggest refining applications of both the "bespeaks cau­
tion" doctrine and statutory safe harbors codifying that doctrine to 
make them more sensitive to whether any cautionary language is in­
fused with sufficient negative affect offsetting the positive feelings 
induced by optimistic forward-looking statements . 
V II. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has critically analyzed three relatively recent doctrinal 
developments in jurisprudence by the United States Supreme Court 
and lower courts about securities litigation and enforcement . These 
1 42 15 USC 7 7z-2(c ) ( 1 )  (2002); 15 USC 78u-5(c )( 1 )  (2002). 
1 4 '  1 5  USC 7 7z-2( c )( 1 ) (A) ( i )  ( 2002); 1 5  USC 78u-5( c) ( 1 ) (A) ( i )  (2002) .  
1 44 1 5  USC 7 7z-2( c) (2) (2002); 1 5  USC 78u-5 (c )(2 )  (2002) .  
1 4 5  15  USC 7 7z-2(c ) (2 ) (A) ( i i )  (2002); 15  USC 78u-5 ( c ) (2 ) (A) ( i i )  (2002) .  
1 4 6  15 USC 7 7z-2(c ) (2 ) (B ) ( i )  (2002); 15 USC 78u-5 (c ) (2) (B ) ( i )  (2002) .  
147 15  USC 78u-5 (2002) .  
1 4s Harris v Ivax Corp, 1 82 F3d 799, 807 ( 1 1 th Cir 1990 ) .  
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three judicial trends involve the acceptance of certain defenses in se­
curities fraud cases. The first development is judicial recognition of 
the so-called puffery defense, which states that mere puffery is not 
material and therefore not actionable under federal securities laws . 
The second development is judicial acceptance of the so-called truth­
on-the-market defense, which exemplifies the so-called "total mix" 
of information analysis . The third development is the judicially cre­
ated so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and statutory safe harbors 
codifying it. 
This Article advocates rethinking the central notions of material­
ity of information and reasonableness of investors . In particular, this 
Article contends that the so-called puffery defense is problematic be­
cause it fails to acknowledge that puffery can affect moods and in so 
doing influence securities investing. This Article also recommends 
expanding the so-called "total mix" of information analysis by con­
sidering the " total affect" of information . This Article finally sug­
gests an extension of the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine and 
statutory safe harbors codifying it by a determination of whether so­
called "meaningful cautionary language" affects moods . 
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that statements about se­
curities in addition to their cognitive component may carry an affec­
tive component, which influences decisions by some investors . This 
observation means that several judicial doctrines based upon a belief 
about how investors process cognitive information are therefore mis­
guided. The SEC basically does not regulate affect, and hence securi­
ties issuers and securities brokers have opportunities to exploit secu­
rities markets without facing any legal and regulatory consequences 
from the SEC . This means that certain statements which the SEC 
treats as being cognitively meaningless, such as so-called puffery, may 
actually have an effect, while other statements which the SEC con­
siders to be cognitively meaningful, such as the bespeaks caution doc­
trine and the " total mix" analysis, actually have little or no influence 
upon securities investors . To be clear, this Article does not argue that 
everybody always engages in moody investing, but instead that cer­
tain situations are more likely to foster moody investing. The impor­
tant point for legal policy is that securities issuers, brokers, and other 
professionals can generate such environments by their disclosures, 
advertising, and other attempts to persuade investors . The perspec­
tive of this Article is consistent with the recently proposed notion 
that people are situational characters as opposed to rational actors. 1 4Y 
1 •" Jon D .  Hanson and David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situa­
tional Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 1 52 U Pa L 
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A recent content analysis of 547 mutual funds advertisements that 
appeared in Barron's or Money found that such ads did not provide the 
information that financial theory suggests as critical for making in­
formed and sound investment choices . 1 50 
Although it may seem that restricting the scope of the puffery de­
fensei undertaking a " total affective mix" analysisi altering the scope 
of the protection that both the "bespeaks caution" doctrine and 
statutory safe harbors codifying that doctrine provides raises First 
Amendment concernsi so could the whole regulatory philosophy of 
mandatory securities disclosuresi and most of securities regulation, 
because it concerns how securities issuers and professionals are per­
mitted to communicate with securities investors . 1 5 1  But, the United 
States Supreme Court has long since rejected the position that speech 
employed directly or indirectly to sell securities is totally protected 
by the First Amendment.  1 52 In fact, the United States Supreme Court 
suggested that the commercial speech doctrine's First Amendment 
protections do not detract from governmental power to regulate se­
curities . 1 53 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court distinguished 
securities regulation from the more general category of commercial 
speech regulation . 1 54 
It is worth noting, in closing, that several of the current research 
trends on the role of moods in persuasion that this Article applied to 
particular securities regulations issues have broader implications for 
many other legal and policy areas. For example, such ambient char­
acteristics as candlelight and comforting, soft music can increase the 
Rev 1 29, 1 55 (2003 ) ( arguing for "an approach to legal theory that conceptualizes 
people's behavior more accurately in the locus of situation" based upon social psycho­
logical experimental research) .  See also Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Mar­
ket, 94 Am Econ Rev 408, 409 n .2 ( 2004) (arguing that emotional aspects of decision­
making explain the power of situations ) .  
l so Bruce A. Huhmann and Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does Mutual Fund Adver­
tising Practice Conform to Financial Theories of the Information Needed for Invest­
ment Decisions' (unpublished manuscript, available at www.ssrn.com) ( Mar. 5 ,  2004 ) .  
1 0 1  There is a nascent literature attempting to reconcile securities regulation and 
the First Amendment. See Donald E. Lively, Securities R egulation and the Freedom of 
the Press. Toward A Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 Wash 
L Rev 843 ( 1 985 ); Michael E. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on 
Advertising of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1 933, 4 1  Bus Law 3 7 7  I 1 986 ); The 
First Amendment and Federal Securities R egulation: A Symposium .  20 Conn L Rev 
26 1 ( 1 988 ) ;  and Symposium, The First Amendment and Government R egulation of 
Economic Markets, Brook L Rev 5 ( 1 989 ) .  
1'2 See, for example, Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 4 1 3  US 49, 6 1 -62, 64 ( 1 975 ), and 
cases cited. 
1'3 Ohralick v Ohio State Bar Assn, 436 US 447, 456 ( 1 978 ) .  
1 s '  Dun eJ Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss Builders, 472 US 749, 478 fn 5 ( 1 985 ) .  
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duration of eating. 1 55 In particular, advances in the marketing and so­
cial psychology literatures raise these important positive and norma­
tive questions for the legal system. 1 56 First, can law influence the in­
terplay between automatically induced affective reactions and more 
controlled, effortful cognitive reactions ? 1 57 Second, should law regu­
late differently hot emotions and cold emotions, which require more 
cognitive processing? 1 58 Third, in light of the finding that affective 
states of the same valence have distinct, predictable influences on per­
suasion, decision making, and motivation, 1 59 how should the legal sys­
tem account for specific emotions? 1 6° Fourth, given that older adults 
1"5 Brian Wansink, Environmental Factors That Increase the Food Intake and Con­
sumption Volume of Unknowing Consumers, 24 Ann Rev Nutrition 455, 460-6 1 ,  4 7 1  
(2004) ( reporting o n  how the atmospherics o f  eating environments influence the length 
of eating) .  
1 56 This brief synopsis draws upon Patti  Williams, The R ole of Emotions in Per­
suasion, Address at the Association for Consumer Research Doctoral Consortium 
(Oct.  9, 2003 ) .  
1 57 Baba Shiv and Alexander Fedorikhin, Heart and Mind i n  Conflict :  The Interplay 
of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J Consumer Rsrch 2 78, 
282-90 ( 1 999)  ( reporting on two experiments ) .  
1" Roger Giner-Sorolla, Guilty Pleasures and Grim Necessities.· Affective Atti­
tudes in Dilemmas of Self-Control, 80 J Personality & Soc Psycho! 206, 208 - 1 9 (200 1 )  
( reporting on four studies ) .  
1 "9 Rajagopal Raghunathan and Michel Tuan Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not 
Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision Making, 22 Org 
Behav & Human Decision Processes 56,  63-72 ( 1 999) ( reporting differences in the be­
havior of anxious versus sad individuals for gambling and job selection ) ;  Jennifer S. 
Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger. and Risk, 8 1  J Personality & Soc Psycho! 1 46, 
1 47 (200 1 )  (finding that fearful people make pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse 
choices, while angry people make optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices ); 
Daniel M.T Fessler, Elizabeth G.  Pillsworth, and Thomas J. Flamson, Angry Men and 
Disgusted Wom en: An Evolutionary Approach to the Influence of Emotions on Risk 
Taking, 95 Org Behav & Human Decision Processes 1 07 (2004 ) ( demonstrating that 
anger increases risk taking by men, but disgust decreases risk taking by women); 
and David DeSteno et al, Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The R ole of Emotion­
Induced Expectancies, 86 J Personality & Soc Psycho! 43, 45 ( 2004 ) (finding that spe­
cific emotions can influence the persuasive impact of messages ). 
t m See, for example, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless :  On Knowing 
the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 1 3 0-36 ( New, 2004) ( discussing legal 
implications of anxiety over dreaded risks);  Rachel Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply 
to Professor Sunstein, 42 Washburn L J 1 ,  5 ( 2002) ( criticizing legal policies based on 
merely cognitive approaches to analyzing fear); Rachel Moran, Law and Emotion, Love 
and Hate, 1 1  J Con temp Legal Issues 747, 754-83 (200 1 )  ( analyzing hate crime laws and 
these three torts: seduction, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation ); Mar­
tin E .P. Seligman, et al, Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 Cardozo L Rev 33, 35, 39-53 
(200 1 )  (analyzing how the new field of "positive psychology" suggests ways to improve 
the quality of life at large law firms); and Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 1 1 5  Harv 
L Rev 1 1 1 9 (2002) ( reviewing Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk ( 2000 ) ) .  
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pay more attention to emotional than rational advertising appeals, 1 6 1  
what are the implications for the debate among legal scholars about 
paternalism? 162 Fifth, given the recent advances in the neuropsychol­
ogy of affect, 1 63 what are the ethical, legal, and social implications of 
the research on the neuropsychology of affect ? 1 64 
t o t  See, for example, Patti Williams and Aimee Drolet, The Moderating Influence 
of Aging on Responses to Rational Versus Emotional Advertising Appeals, unpub­
lished manuscript, available online at http:/ /hops.wharton.upenn.edu/peoplejfaculty 
/williams.html (2003 ) (presenting three sets of experimental results ) .  
t 62 See, for example, Colin Camerer, et al, R egulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism ", 1 5 1  U Pa L Rev 1 2 1 1 ,  1 2 1 2-
1 3  ( 2003 ) ( defining asymmetric paternalism as regulation that confers large benefits on 
decision-makers those prone to errors, while imposing little if no zero costs on com­
pletely rational decision-makers ) ;  Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1 1 59 (2003 ) (defining libertarian pa­
ternalism as policies that attempt to steer people's decisions in directions that pro­
mote their welfare, but without eliminating their freedom of choice); and Richard H. 
Thaler and Cass R .  Sunstein, LibeTtarian Paternalism, 93 Am Econ Rev 1 75,  1 76-77 
( 2003 ) ( arguing that paternalism is unavoidable) .  
t o.l Gerald Zaltman, Consumer R esearchers: Take a Hike ', 26 J Consumer Rsrch 
423, 425-28 (2000) ( advocating that consumer researchers draw upon neurological re­
search on the brain ) .  See also Joseph Dumit, Picturing PeTsonhood: Brian Scans and 
Biomedicol Identity 1 72-85 ( Princeton, 2004) ( discussing PET [Positron Emission To­
mography] scans of depressed persons); and Fionnuala C. Murphy, et al, Functional 
Neuroonotomy of Emotions : A Meto-Anolysis, 3 Cognitive, Affective, & Behav Neu­
rosci 207 (2003 ) ( applying novel statistical methods to analyze 1 06 PET and fMRI 
[functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging] studies of human emotions ) .  See generally 
Mark F. Bear, et al, Nemoscience: Exploring the Bwin 58 1 -605 (Lippincott, Williams & 
Wilkins 2d ed, 200 1 ); Neil R. Carslon, Physiology of Behavior 1 50-5 1 ,  343 -72 (Allyn & 
Bacon 8th ed, 2004); Richard D .  Lane and Lynn Nadel, eds, Cognitive Nemoscience of 
Emotion (Oxford, 2000 ) ;  and Bryan Kolb and Ian Q.  Whishaw, Fundomentals of Hum on 
Neuropsychology 5 1 6-42 (Worth, 2003 ) .  
1 64 See, for example, Terrence R. Charvat, Vernon Smith, and Kevin McCabe, Law 
and Neuroeconomics, George Mason University Law & Economics, Research Paper 
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McCabe, The Bmin ond the Law, Phil Transactions Royal Soc'y London ( forthcoming) 
( discussing implications of current neuroscience research for how law can improve so­
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